- Japan's risk premium remains negative but is expected to rebound in 2026, in parallel with a historic jump in its bond yields.
- Adverse demographics and a collapse in domestic savings are forcing the country to depend more on global capital to finance a debt exceeding 230%-240% of GDP.
- The combination of expansionary fiscal policy, monetary normalization, and less support from the Bank of Japan raises the interest bill and increases tension in long-term debt.
- The Japanese debt tightening threatens to spread to global markets via interest rates, the yen, and flows into the debt of the United States and other developed economies.

Japan's risk premium has become a key financial indicator for understanding why the country is definitively leaving behind the era of near-free money. What was once a debt market that was remarkably stable now sets the pace for global volatility, with movements that just a few years ago would have seemed like science fiction for Japanese bonds.
In 2026, Japan faces a structural shift in interest rates, domestic savings, and debt sustainability that is forcing investors to rethink many certainties: from Tokyo's apparent immunity to massive borrowing to the supposed safe haven offered by its long-term bonds. Let's break down what's happening with the Japanese risk premium, why it matters so much now, and what signals it's sending to the rest of the world.
Current situation of Japan's risk premium
The most direct indicator is that Japan's risk premium is currently in negative territory, hovering around -57 points , after rising about 5 points compared to the previous session. This negative value reflects that, compared to the benchmark debt used for the calculation, the perception of risk remains very low, although it is no longer as complacent as it was during the years of ultra-low interest rates.
Looking at recent trading, the risk premium has registered modest but steady increases day after day . In the last session mentioned, it stood again at -57 points, up about 5,5 points from the previous close—a seemingly small but significant movement in a market that had been virtually stagnant for decades.
Over the past twelve months, the Japanese risk premium has risen by approximately 82 basis points , a considerable jump that marks the end of the period of flat, uneven yields. Furthermore, the year-to-date increase is around 3 basis points, confirming that the adjustment is gradual but persistent, more fundamental than merely tactical.
It's important to keep the long term in mind: since 1985, Japan's risk premium has fluctuated between a low of nearly -430 points (recorded at the end of June 1995) and a high of nearly 76 points (around March 10, 2020). This wide range demonstrates that even a country perceived as extremely safe can experience periods of high stress.
Within this context, international comparisons of country-specific risk premiums take on particular relevance . Japan's position, with a still relatively small spread compared to other advanced economies, contrasts sharply with its substantial debt. This has led many analysts to reconsider the narrative that "Japan is a special case" and delve deeper into the underlying factors.

The Japanese bond market in 2026: yields at decade highs
While the risk premium is moving in negative territory but upwards, yields on medium- and long-term Japanese bonds have jumped to levels not seen since the last century . The 10-year bond is currently around 2,1%-2,25%, its highest level since the late 1990s, marking a historic break from the near-zero interest rates that dominated the market for over a decade.
At the very long end of the curve, the increases have been even more striking . The yield on the 30-year bond is hovering around 3,5% (approximately 3,485%), with a cumulative increase of several basis points in just a few weeks, while the 20-year yield is comfortably above 3% (around 3,08%). The message is clear: investors lending money to Japan for the long term are increasingly demanding higher returns.
The true symbol of this new phase is the 40-year Japanese bond, which has surpassed 4% yield for the first time since its creation in 2007. At times of peak stress, it has even reached over 4,2%, marking record highs since its launch and sending an unmistakable signal of heightened fiscal concerns.
This surge in yields is not simply a technical adjustment. The market is pricing in a rising risk premium linked to the perceived deterioration of public finances , the shift in monetary policy, and the demographic change. The leap from a zero-interest-rate environment to a scenario of clearly positive yields necessitates a complete recalibration of the risk landscape.
It is particularly noteworthy that this rebound has occurred even with the Bank of Japan's (BoJ) benchmark interest rate still very low, around 0,75% , and with inflation in December standing at around 2,1%. In other words, real interest rates are now positive across several segments, something Japan has not seen for more than ten years.

Demographics, savings and the end of “Japanese exceptionalism”
To understand why Japanese risk premiums and yields are moving so sharply, it's not enough to look at central bank decisions or political headlines. The root of the problem lies in a much slower and deeper shift: demographic change and its impact on national savings.
For decades, Japan was able to finance its enormous public debt thanks to extraordinary domestic savings . In the 1970s, the national savings rate exceeded 35% of GDP, allowing the country to become one of the world's largest creditors. The state was effectively financed by the money that citizens themselves deposited in banks and local institutions.
That safety net, however, has been eroding as the population ages and the dependency ratio skyrockets . The data is compelling: the national savings rate is currently hovering (with figures from 2025-2026) around 21-23% of GDP, levels similar to the average of many OECD countries. And net household savings have fallen from around 15% in 1990 to figures close to 3% today.
The key factor behind this change is the dependency ratio, which relates the number of people under 15 and over 65 to the working-age population . In Japan, this indicator has soared to around 70%, one of the highest in the world, driven by a plummeting birth rate (approximately 1,2 children per woman) and an increasingly aging population.
When the number of retirees grows so large, an inevitable shift occurs in savings flows : those who are no longer working stop accumulating capital and begin to consume the resources saved during their working lives. If this is compounded by the fact that there are fewer active workers generating income and saving, the result is a sharp decline in net national savings available to finance the government.
This metamorphosis in the economic structure means that the Japanese government can no longer rely almost exclusively on domestic savings to service its debt . Gradually, it is forced to compete for global capital, which means accepting interest rates dictated by an international market far less patient with chronic deficits and exorbitant debt.

Monetary policy, expansionary fiscal policy, and clash with the markets
Alongside demographic changes, Japan has begun to move away from an ultra-expansionary monetary policy that had been in place for decades . The end of tight control over the yield curve and the Bank of Japan's first rate hike in about thirty years marked a turning point. Even so, the official rate remains at a modest 0,75%, well below the yield demanded in the long term.
This context is complicated by the clash between a more aggressive fiscal policy and a central bank attempting to normalize the economy . Following the arrival of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, with a distinctly conservative profile and strong popularity in the polls, the government has opted for a program combining tax cuts and increased spending, under the label of “responsible fiscal expansion.”
Among the measures announced are, for example, the intention to temporarily suspend the sales tax on food and a powerful stimulus package of over 21 trillion yen, designed to alleviate the impact of inflation and suppressed wages. The problem is that this stimulus comes amid soaring borrowing costs and with public debt exceeding 230%-260% of GDP, depending on the benchmark used.
Investors reacted by selling Japanese debt, especially very long-term bonds like the 30- and 40-year maturities . The session in which yields on the 40-year bond first surpassed 4% was described by traders in Tokyo as one of the most chaotic in recent memory, with movements of more than 25 basis points in a single day.
Some analysts compare this episode to the so-called "Liz Truss moment" in the UK: a combination of expansionary fiscal announcements, funding concerns, and a sharp market reaction that quickly puts governments in a difficult position. In Japan's case, public debt clearly exceeds 230% of GDP, the highest ratio among developed economies, which amplifies the nervousness.
The Bank of Japan, for its part, has opted to maintain the benchmark interest rate at 0,75% and moderate the pace of sovereign bond purchases starting in April 2026. This decision indicates that the central bank is not prepared to curb every rise in yields as it did during the era of tight yield curve control, leaving the market more exposed to pure supply and demand forces.
Record budget, cost of debt, and adjustments in issuance
The shift in the perception of fiscal risk is clearly reflected in the budget figures. For fiscal year 2026, Japan has approved an initial budget of 122,3 trillion yen , equivalent to approximately 665.900 billion euros at the ECB's reference exchange rate (1 euro = 183,67 yen as of January 16, 2026).
Within that budget, the allocation for debt servicing amounts to 31,3 trillion yen , approximately €170.400 billion. The increase in yields translates into an increasingly heavy interest bill, which absorbs a growing portion of public spending and reduces the available scope for new measures without raising taxes or cutting spending in other areas.
Faced with pressure on long-term bonds, the Ministry of Finance has taken action with a plan to adjust issuances . The draft program for the fiscal year April 2025-March 2026 envisions reducing the volume of very long-term bonds (20, 30, and 40 years) by approximately 10% compared to the original program. This represents a cut of about 0,5 trillion yen, leaving total annual issuance at around 171,8 trillion yen.
To offset this reduction, plans are underway to increase short-term issuances, such as 2-year bonds and Treasury bills , as well as explore buybacks of very long-term bonds issued during periods of extremely low yields. The aim is to improve the balance between supply and demand and prevent auctions of ultra-long-term bonds from remaining a source of tension.
Analysts at institutions like Bankinter consider these measures an expected reaction to calm the market after several auctions with weak demand and sharp increases in yields. It's an attempt to manage risk: less debt with very long maturities, slightly more in the short term, and a Bank of Japan that is gradually ceasing to be the almost sole buyer.
Meanwhile, Japan's overall debt position remains colossal . In 2023, public debt hovered around €9,35 trillion (over $10,1 trillion), representing approximately 240% of GDP and placing the country second in relative debt in the world. Per capita debt far exceeds €75.000 per inhabitant, among the highest internationally.
Who holds Japan's debt and how does this change the balance?
Until now, the apparent stability of the system was based on a very unique pattern of debt ownership : a majority of domestic investors, a strong presence of local banks, insurers and pension funds, and a massive role for the Bank of Japan as a major buyer of government bonds.
Based on preliminary data from September 2025, the total volume of outstanding government bonds and bills reached approximately 1.185 trillion yen , equivalent to roughly 6,45 trillion euros. Of that amount, the Bank of Japan held approximately 523,9 trillion yen (around 2,85 trillion euros) on its balance sheet, nearly half of the total.
This system has worked reasonably well while the central bank was willing to buy with virtually no limits and domestic savings were abundant . However, the BoJ's gradual withdrawal as the dominant buyer and the decline in savings are forcing the market to rely increasingly on private demand, both domestic and international.
That's where the risk premium comes into play again: when the central bank's artificial support is reduced, investors demand higher yields as a buffer against fiscal risk , which is reflected in a steeper yield curve and greater tensions in very long-term auctions.
The message from the IMF and other organizations is that Japanese debt represents a medium-term risk , especially from the next decade onwards, when the aging population will further strain spending on pensions, healthcare and long-term care, precisely in an environment of higher interest rates and fewer captive buyers.
The role of the yen and international contagion channels
The storm in Japanese bonds is not confined to domestic markets. The yen has come under heavy pressure, acting as an additional barometer of market anxiety . The combination of rising yields and a weak currency is unsettling: it suggests that investors are uncertain about both the fiscal outlook and the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the situation.
Meanwhile, Japan is the largest foreign holder of US Treasury debt , with a position of around $1,2 trillion at the end of 2025 (just over €1,03 trillion). If the yield on Japanese debt gets too close to that of US bonds, Japanese insurers, funds, and banks may decide to repatriate some of that capital, reducing marginal demand for bonds in the United States and Europe.
This potential movement would put upward pressure on global yields , amplifying the ripple effect of what is happening in Tokyo. The currency channel should not be overlooked: monetary normalization, coupled with changes in expectations regarding the yen, could trigger massive unwinding of carry trade strategies that used the yen as a cheap financing currency.
In fact, signs of tension are already emerging outside of Japan . The MOVE index, which measures volatility in US fixed income, has risen sharply in conjunction with the Japanese turbulence. Gold has climbed decisively in just a few sessions, reaching record highs, and the 10-year US Treasury bond has once again exceeded 4,3% at certain points.
In the derivatives markets, demand for hedging against rising yen interest rates and falling Nikkei 225 stocks has increased , reflecting fund managers adjusting their risk positions. These movements may not be visible to the general public, but they indicate that the professional market is taking the possibility of regime change in Japan very seriously.
Japan's macroeconomic context: beyond the risk premium
To complete the picture, it's necessary to look at some basic indicators. Japan is the world's third-largest economy by GDP , with an area of almost 378.000 km² and a population of nearly 124 million. Its population density exceeds 320 inhabitants per km², making it a very densely populated country for its size.
The capital is Tokyo, and the official currency is the Japanese yen, which has experienced periods of high volatility due to changing expectations regarding interest rates and interventions in the foreign exchange market. In terms of unemployment, Japan continues to stand out: the rate is around 2,6%, one of the lowest in the world, reflecting a tight, albeit aging, labor market.
In 2024, GDP per capita was around €29.983 (approximately $32.443) , placing the country around 42nd in the world ranking for this indicator. The Human Development Index indicates a high quality of life, with good levels of education and healthcare, despite the challenges posed by rapid population aging.
In terms of prices, the annual change in the CPI published for February 2026 is around 1,3% , a moderate rate that contrasts with the inflationary episodes experienced in other advanced economies. This gives the Bank of Japan some leeway, but at the same time makes the effects of the interest rate hike on the debt burden more visible without the "comfort" of very high inflation to erode the value of the debt.
Regarding the business climate, Japan ranks around 39th in the Doing Business ranking , indicating a relatively favorable environment for operating, albeit with some rigidities. In terms of perceived corruption, the country scores around 73 points, suggesting a low level of corruption in the public sector and strong institutions—factors that have historically contributed to investor confidence.
All this macro background helps to understand a paradox: a country with strong institutions, high income levels and low inflation can still see its risk premium and interest rates jump when the combination of excessive debt, dwindling savings and expansionary fiscal policies crosses certain red lines perceived by the markets.
The Japanese case serves, in fact, as a warning to other highly indebted countries without a comparable domestic savings buffer . If economies like the United States, France, or Spain were to experience similar declines in savings to those suffered by Japan, their capacity to sustain high levels of debt without facing market repercussions would be much smaller, increasing the risk of debt crises and sharp increases in risk premiums.
Everything happening with Japan's risk premium in 2026 shows that the supposed protection of economies with reserve currencies has clear limits . Demographics, savings, and fiscal discipline ultimately prevail; cheap credit and low interest rates are not permanent, and markets eventually demand higher compensation for financing persistent imbalances, even when it comes to the world's third-largest economy.
Table of Contents
- 1 Current situation of Japan's risk premium
- 2 The Japanese bond market in 2026: yields at decade highs
- 3 Demographics, savings and the end of “Japanese exceptionalism”
- 4 Monetary policy, expansionary fiscal policy, and clash with the markets
- 5 Record budget, cost of debt, and adjustments in issuance
- 6 Who holds Japan's debt and how does this change the balance?
- 7 The role of the yen and international contagion channels
- 8 Japan's macroeconomic context: beyond the risk premium